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Abstract. Lightweight stream ciphers are highly demanded in IoT applications. In
order to optimize the hardware performance, a new class of stream cipher has been
proposed. The basic idea is to employ a single Galois NLFSR with maximum period
to construct the cipher. As a representative design of this kind of stream ciphers,
Espresso is based on a 256-bit Galois NLFSR initialized by a 128-bit key. The
2256 − 1 maximum period is assured because the Galois NLFSR is transformed from
a maximum length LFSR. However, we propose a Galois-to-Fibonacci transformation
algorithm and successfully transform the Galois NLFSR into a Fibonacci LFSR with a
nonlinear output function. The transformed cipher is broken by the standard algebraic
attack and the Rønjom-Helleseth attack with complexity O(268.44) and O(266.86)
respectively. The transformation algorithm is derived from a new Fibonacci-to-Galois
transformation algorithm we propose in this paper. Compare to existing algorithms,
proposed algorithms are more efficient and cover more general use cases. Moreover,
the transformation result shows that the Galois NLFSR used in any Espresso-like
stream ciphers can be easily transformed back into the original Fibonacci LFSR.
Therefore, this kind of design should be avoided in the future.
Keywords: Transformation Algorithm · Espresso Cipher · Galois NLFSR · Fibonacci
LFSR · Algebraic Attack.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a new technology paradigm envisioned as a global network
of devices capable of interacting with each other [1]. The devices in IoT usually have
limited computing resources and strict power constraints, hence reliable connections with
highly energy efficient communication technology such as 5G are in need. In the various
study of security solutions for 5G network, a new class of lightweight stream ciphers
has been proposed [2]. We refer to it as the Espresso-like ciphers since Espresso is the
representative design. The basic idea of this new design is to employ a Nonlinear Feedback
shift Register (NLFSR) in Galois configuration as the building block while most of the
known stream ciphers are based on NLFSRs in Fibonacci configuration. By using a Galois
NLFSR, the feedback functions of the cipher are much smaller compared to those based on
Fibonacci NLFSRs, thereby leading to a lower propagation delay in implementation which
is preferred in 5G wireless communication systems. The hardware performance analysis
[2] shows that Espresso is the fastest among the stream ciphers below 1500 GE.
Due to the fact that there is a lack of cryptanalysis being carried out on Galois
NLFSR based stream ciphers, the security analysis of this kind of cipher is conducted
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on a transformed NLFSR F which resembles a Fibonacci NLFSR. The analysis result
in [2] shows that the cipher is resistant to all known attacks. However, we find that the
transformed NLFSR F is not equivalent to the original Galois NLFSR G in the cipher
unless the output function of F is changed accordingly. There is a possibility that the
security of the original NLFSR G based cipher is different from the so called equivalent
NLFSR F based cipher. It is important to reevaluate the validity of this new design
methodology for all kinds of potential weakness.
1.2 Related Work.
1.2.1 Transformation Algorithms
The Galois NLFSR G used in Espresso is transformed from a NLFSR F by applying the
transformation algorithm proposed by Dubrova in 2009 [3]. This algorithm is the first
successful attempt to transform Fibonacci NLFSR into Galois NLFSR. How to find the
matching initial states for NLFSRs before and after transformation is presented in [4].
Based on this algorithm, the author developed a method of constructing n-stage Galois
NLFSRs with period 2n−1 from n-stage maximum length LFSRs [5]. This method laid the
foundation for the design of the class of Espresso-like ciphers. The NLFSR F is constructed
from a 256-stage maximum length LFSR. Then the transformation algorithm [3] is used to
convert F into the Galois NLFSR G. Therefore, the period of the output sequence of G is
2256 − 1, which provides very good statistical properties for the cipher. Later, the author
extend the transformation algorithm to handle Galois-to-Galois case in [6]. This algorithm
is the generalized version of the Fibonacci-to-Galois transformation algorithm [3]. The
equivalence between the two NLFSRs before and after transformation is hold if and only if
they both are "uniform". The definition of "uniform" is described in Section 2.
For the Galois-to-Fibonacci case, there are only a few results have been published. In
2013, Lin [7] proposed a transformation from a Galois NLFSR to a Fibonacci NLFSR. This
algorithm targets at Galois NLFSRs more general than the "uniform" case and studied
the properties of the output sequences of all the bits in the Galois NLFSRs. Another
algorithm [8] is proposed by using a mathematical tool named the semi-tensor product
of matrices. However, the complexity of the proposed algorithm is O(2n), where n is the
length of the NLFSR. This method is not applicable in stream ciphers since the size of
the NLFSR is usually larger than 80-bit due to security concerns. Besides, the common
problem in all the discussed algorithms is that the output function of an NLFSR is assumed
to only tap from the 0th bit, which is infeasible in stream ciphers where the output takes
multiple bits from the NLFSR. Furthermore, it is pointed out by the author in [6] that
the sequence of states of the two NLFSRs before and after transformation differ in several
bit positions. How to efficiently and correctly transform more generalized NLFSRs with
output function taken arbitrary taps from the NLFSR remain unsolved.
1.2.2 Security Attacks
Shortly after the Espresso being published, a related key chosen-IV attack is proposed
by Wang et.al [9]. This attack is mounted on a variant of Espresso cipher denoted by
Espresso-a. Similar as the transformation between NLFSR G and F described in Espresso,
this variant is transformed from G by using the algorithm in [3]. This attack recovers the
128-bit secret key with complexity O(264). However, the output function of the variant
Espresso-a is the same as that of Espresso. This causes the same issue of the security
analysis in the Espresso [2] as we mentioned before. In another published paper [10], an
algebraic attack is mounted on Espresso cipher. Based on the fact that the Galois NLFSR
used in Espresso cipher is constructed from a LFSR, the authors believe there must be a
bijection between the NLFSR and the LFSR. They use an unknown mathematical software
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to find the filter function of the LFSR and present it only by parameters instead of the
exact function, hence making it difficult to verify the result. Their method works only
when the original LFSR is known to the attacker.
In this paper, we propose a new and original transformation algorithm which is able
to convert the whole class of Espresso-like cipher into LFSR filter generators and the
proposed algorithm works even without knowing the original LFSR. Then we use algebraic
attacks to break the transformed Espresso cipher. Algebraic attacks are very powerful to
cryptanalyse LFSR-based stream ciphers. The main idea is to solve a system of algebraic
equations between key bits and output bits. The core of the attack is to reduce the degree
of the equations so that linearization method or XL method can be used to solve these
equations efficiently. In 2003, Courtois et.al [11] proposed a general algebraic attack. They
multiply the algebraic equations by well-chosen multivariate polynomials to lower the
degree of these equations. Several subsequent researches have been published to speed
up the solving process [12, 13, 14]. The attack in [14] is the most efficient attack among
existing algebraic attacks. Meanwhile, several approaches have been proposed to evaluate
the ability of the output functions against algebraic attack which is denoted as the algebraic
immunity [15, 16]. How to construct such high algebraic immunity Boolean functions is
presented in [17, 18, 19].
1.3 Our Contributions.
The contribution of this paper is listed below.
1. We point out that the common problem in existing transformation algorithms is the
output function is assumed to be fz = x0. However, in real NLFSR-based stream ciphers,
the output function usually takes multiple taps from the NLFSR. In order to solve this
problem, we develop an idea of compensating the output function and feedback functions
of the NLFSR during transformation.
2. Based on the compensation idea, we propose a Fibonacci-to-Galois NLFSR transfor-
mation algorithm and a Galois-to-Fibonacci NLFSR transformation algorithm. Compare
to existing transformation algorithms, the proposed algorithms are more efficient and gen-
eralized. First, the proposed algorithms has linear complexity and applicable on NLFSRs
with arbitrary length. Second, bith algorithms cover more general cases compare to the
"uniform" case in [3]. Third, no matter which taps from the NLFSR are taken in the output
function, both algorithms show how to construct the corresponding output function and
compute the initial value for the transformed NLFSR.
2. We customise the Galois-to-Fibonacci transformation algorithm to an Uniform_Galois-
to-Fibonacci algorithm to deal with the class of Espresso-like stream ciphers. The result
shows that the Galois NLFSR used in any of this kind of ciphers can be transformed to a
Fibonacci LFSR. The cipher after transformation is equivalent to a linear filter generator
based stream cipher.
3. We analyze the security of Espresso cipher on its transformed version and find out
that it can be easily broken by typical attacks against linear filter generators. We apply
the standard algebraic attack and the Rønjom-Helleseth attack and break the transformed
cipher with complexity O(268.44) and O(266.86) respectively. We discuss other related
attacks and conclude that this design method should not be used in the future.
1.4 Outline.
In Section 2, we describe some necessary preliminaries and present the design specification
of the Espresso cipher. Then we propose generalized NLFSR transformation algorithms in
Section 3. In Section 4, we apply the proposed Uniform_Galois-to-Fibonacci algorithm
on the Galois NLFSR with period 2n − 1 and show the result of transformation of G in
Espresso cipher as an example. We then mount algebraic attacks on the transformed cipher
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and discuss the overall security of the class of Espresso-like stream ciphers in Section 5.
We conclude in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 FSRs
An n-bit Feedback Shift Register (FSR) consists of n binary storage elements. We refer
to each storage element as a stage or tap represented by xi, i ∈ [0, n − 1]. A FSR is
controlled by a system clock, the bit values stored in it are shifted one stage to the left and
the last stage is updated by a feedback function f(X) = f(x0, . . . , xn−1) which takes any
taps as input. A Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) is a FSR with a linear feedback
function. A Nonlinear Feedback Shift Register (NFSR) is a FSR with a nonlinear feedback
function. The output function and feedback functions in a FSR are Boolean functions.
We denote the addition and multiplication in GF (2) as "⊕" and "·" respectively
throughout the paper.
Definition 1. The algebraic normal form (ANF) of a Boolean function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}
is a polynomial in GF(2) of type [3]
fn−1 =
∑2n−1
i=0 cix
i0
0 . . . x
in−1
n−1 ,
where ci, i0, . . . , in−1 ∈ {0, 1}. Each term in a Boolean function is called a monomial.
For example, in function f = x0 ⊕ x1x2, both x0 and x1x2 are called a monomial.
dep(·). A dependence list of a Boolean function g denoted by dep(g) is the list of
the indexes of all the involved stages of FSR. For example, g = x0 ⊕ x1 ⊕ x2x3, then
dep(g) = [0, 1, 2, 3]. If the indexes in the dependence list of g are increased by i, we denote
it as g|+i. For example, g = x2x3, then dep(g) = [2, 3], g|+1 = x3x4 and dep(g|+1) = [3, 4].
If the function g only has one term, then it is a monomial denoted as m. dep(m) is the
dependence list of the monomial.
We denote the the set of all the bits in FSR as an internal state Xt = {xt0, . . . , xtn−1}
at each clock t. The initial value X0 = {x00, . . . , x0n−1} is the first internal state of the
FSR. In a FSR, the output sequence is default of the sequence generated by tap x0. In
FSR-based stream ciphers, the output sequence is usually generated by a output function
fz(x0, . . . , xn−1) which takes any tap from the FSR.
Configurations. A FSR can be implemented in two kinds of configurations, namely
Fibonacci and Galois configuration. In the Fibonacci configuration, the feedback is
only applied to the last stage. In the Galois configuration, the feedback can be applied
to every stage. An example of 4-bit Fibonacci NLFSR is given in Figure 1. The feedback
f3 is only applied to the last stage x3. In Figure 2, we present a 4-bit Galois NLFSR. The
feedback f2 is applied to x2 and the feedback f3 is applied to x3.
Figure 1: An example of a 4-bit Fibonacci NLFSR.
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Figure 2: An example of a 4-bit Galois NLFSR.
Definition 2. Given an n-bit NLFSR. Suppose the smallest index of the stage that
updated by a feedback is τ . The NLFSR is uniform if the feedback functions are of type
fn−1 = x0 ⊕ gn−1(x1, . . . , xτ )
. . .
fτ = xτ+1 ⊕ gτ (x0, . . . , xτ )
fi = xi+1 for i ∈ [0, τ − 1],
(1)
where gi, i ∈ [τ, n− 1] is a Boolean function with max(dep(gi)) ≤ τ and 0 /∈ dep(gn−1).
2.2 Galois NLFSRs with Period 2n − 1
The problem of constructing NLFSR generating sequence with given long period is an open
problem in studying the theory of NLFSR. In order to solve this problem, a scalable method
is proposed to construct Galois NLFSRs with period 2n−1 from a n-stage maximum-length
LFSR [5]. The main idea is to employ the transformation algorithm presented in [3] to
shift nonlinear monomials from the feedback function of the last stage to lower stages in
the LFSR. Since the FSR before and after transformation are equivalent, the transformed
FSR is a Galois NLFSR with period 2n − 1. The validity of this method is proved by the
following theorem proposed in [5].
Theorem 1. Let N be an n-stage NLFSR with the feedback functions of type
fn−1 = fL ⊕ fN (x1, x2, . . . , xn−2)
fn−2 = xn−1 ⊕ fN (x0, x1, . . . , xn−3)
fn−3 = xn−2
. . .
f0 = x1,
where fL is a linear Boolean function of type
fL = x0 ⊕ c1x1 ⊕ . . .⊕ cn−2xn−2,
where ci ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ [1, n− 2]. If the corresponding character polynomial
g(x) = 1 + c1x+ c2x2 + . . .+ cn−2xn−2 + xn
is primitive. Then N has period 2n − 1.
The Galois NLFSR defined in Theorem 1 is one of the results of transformation of the
maximum LFSR with feedback function fn−1 = x0⊕fL(x1, . . . , xτ )⊕fN (x1, x2, . . . , xn−τ )⊕
fN (x1, x2, . . . , xn−τ ). According to the transformation algorithm in [3], the monomials in
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fN can be further shifted to lower stages as long as the NLFSR after shifting is "uniform".
Formally, we define the transformed NLFSR by feedback functions
fn−1 = x0 ⊕ gn−1(x1, . . . , xn−τ )
fn−2 = xn−1 ⊕ gn−2(x0, . . . , xn−τ−1)
. . .
fτ = xτ+1 ⊕ gτ (x0, x1)
fτ−1 = xτ
. . .
f0 = x1.
After shifting the monomials in fN to different stages, the depth of circuits implementing
the feedback functions is reduced, resulting in faster and small NLFSRs. This design
method seems to be very promising for the 5G applications.
2.3 Espresso Cipher
The main building block of the Espresso cipher [2] is a 256-bit Galois NLFSR G, which is
constructed by the method present in Section 2.2. The designers first choose a maximum-
length Fibonacci LFSR with feedback function
f255 = x0 ⊕ x12 ⊕ x48 ⊕ x115 ⊕ x133 ⊕ x213.
Then they construct a Galois NLFSR F from the LFSR as
f255 = x0 ⊕ x12 ⊕ x48 ⊕ x115 ⊕ x133 ⊕ x213 ⊕ x41x70 ⊕ x46x87
f217 = x218 ⊕ x3x32 ⊕ x8x49 ⊕ x14x72 ⊕ x17x92 ⊕ x24x119 ⊕ x36x145 ⊕ x49x72x92x119,
and all remaining feedback functions are of type fi = xi+1.
The monomials in the functions are shifted to lower stages. The Galois NLFSR F is
transformed to G
f255 = x0 ⊕ x41x70
f251 = x252 ⊕ x42x83 ⊕ x8
f247 = x248 ⊕ x44x102 ⊕ x40
f243 = x244 ⊕ x43x118 ⊕ x103
f239 = x240 ⊕ x46x141 ⊕ x117
g235 = x236 ⊕ x67x90x110x137
f231 = x232 ⊕ x50x159 ⊕ x189
f217 = x218 ⊕ x3x32
f213 = x214 ⊕ x4x45
f209 = x210 ⊕ x6x64
f205 = x206 ⊕ x5x80
f201 = x202 ⊕ x8x103
f197 = x198 ⊕ x29x52x72x99
f193 = x194 ⊕ x12x121.
The rest of the functions remain as fi = xi+1.
The output function for Espresso is a nonlinear function with 20 variables
fz = x80 ⊕ x99 ⊕ x137 ⊕ x227 ⊕ x222 ⊕ x187 ⊕ x243x217 ⊕ x247x231 ⊕ x213x235 ⊕ x255x251 ⊕
x181x239 ⊕ x174x44 ⊕ x164x29 ⊕ x255x247x243x213x181x174.
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The cipher is initialized by a 128-bit key ki, 0 ≤ i ≤ 127 and an 96-bit initialization
value IV. The initial internal states are
xi = ki, 0 ≤ i ≤ 127
xi = IVi−128, 128 ≤ i ≤ 223
xi = 1, 224 ≤ i ≤ 254
xi = 0, i = 255.
At the initialization phase, the cipher would be clocked 256 times, the output bit is
xored with the stages x255 and x217
f255 = x0 ⊕ x41x70 ⊕ fz
f217 = x218 ⊕ x3x32 ⊕ fz.
3 Transformation Algorithms
In this section, we analyze the difference in internal states of the two NLFSRs before and
after transformation. In order to fix the difference, we develop an idea of compensating
the feedback function. Based on this idea, we propose several transformation algorithms
for different application cases respectively. In the proposed algorithms, we consider the
output function taken arbitrary taps from the NLFSR, and show the method to construct
the corresponding output function and initial value for the transformed NLFSR.
3.1 Difference in Internal States
The transformation of a NLFSR is done by shifting the monomials from a feedback function
to another one. We define shifting a monomial m from feedback function fa to fb as below
[3].
Definition 3. Let fa and fb be feedback functions of bit xa and xb of an n-bit NLFSR,
where a, b ∈ [0, n− 1] and a 6= b. The operation shifting moves a monomial m from fa to
fb, denoted by fa
m−→ fb. The index of each variable xi in m is changed to x(i−a+b) mod n.
The shifted monomial in fb is denoted by m|(−a+b) mod n.
Suppose we shift a monomial m with dep(m) ⊆ [1, n − 1] in the feedback function
fn−1 of a Fibonacci NLFSR to another feedback function fb following Definition 3. The
Fibonacci NLFSR is transformed to the Galois NLFSR
fn−1 = x0 ⊕ gn−1(x1, . . . , xn−1)⊕m
. . .
fb = xb+1 ⊕m|−(n−1−b)
fb−1 = xb
. . .
f0 = x1.
In the feedback function fn−1, m is xored to it representing that m is moved from this
function and m|−(n−1−b) is xored to fb showing that the monomial is shifted to fb.
Now we analyze the internal states of NLFSRs before and after shifting a monomial.
Suppose the internal states at clock t of the Fibonacci NLFSR and the Galois NLFSR
are denoted by Xt = {xt0, . . . , xtn−1} and Xˆt = {xˆt0, . . . , xˆtn−1} respectively and Xt = Xˆt.
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Then the internal states at next clock of the Fibonacci NLFSR are computed as
xt+1n−1 = xt0 ⊕ gn−1(xt1, . . . , xtn−1)
. . .
xt+1b = x
t
b+1
xt+1b−1 = x
t
b
. . .
xt+10 = xt1
and the internal states at next clock of the Galois NLFSR are computed as
xˆt+1n−1 = xˆt0 ⊕ gn−1(xˆt1, . . . , xˆtn−1)⊕ mˆt
. . .
xˆt+1b = xˆ
t
b+1 ⊕ mˆ|t−(n−1−b)
xˆt+1b−1 = xˆ
t
b
. . .
xˆt+10 = xˆt1.
We compare Xt+1 and Xˆt+1 and find that they differ at bit xn−1 and xb. If we continue
running the two NLFSRs, the internal states will differ in every bit. In [3], it is proved that
if the Galois NLFSR after transformation is "uniform", then the internal states only differ
in bits xb+1, . . . , xn−1 between the two NLFSRs if the initial value of the Galois NLFSR is
calculated by the theorem in [4]. Therefore, if the output function of the NLFSR takes
inputs from any bit among xb+1, . . . , xn−1, then the two NLFSRs will generate different
output sequences. In order to solve this problem. We develop the idea of compensating
feedback functions of the NLFSR during the transformation.
Definition 4. Given an n-bit NLFSR, suppose we shift a monomial m from fa to
fb where a, b ∈ [0, n − 1] and a > b, the compensation list is constructed as C =
[0, . . . , 0,m|−(a−b), . . . ,m|−1, 0, . . . , 0] where C[i] = 0 for i ∈ [0, b] or [a + 1, n − 1] and
C[i] = m|−(a−i+1) for i ∈ [b+ 1, a].
Definition 5. Given a Boolean function f(x0, . . . , xn−1) and a compensation list C. The
operation compensating replaces the tap xi in f by xi ⊕ C[i] iteratively from i = n− 1 to
i = 0.
Based on the compensation idea, we prove that the differences between internal states
of the two NLFSRs before and after transformation satisfy a relationship in the following
Lemma.
Lemma 1. Given an n-bit Fibonacci NLFSR, we shift a monomial m with dep(m) ⊆
[1, n−1] from feedback function fn−1 to fb by Definition 3. We construct the compensation
list by Definition 4 and compensate all the gj , j ∈ [0, n − 1] in feedback functions of the
transformed NLFSR according to Definition 5 and calculate the initial value for it by the
following equations
xˆti = xti ⊕m|t−(n−i) for i ∈ [b+ 1, n− 1];
xˆti = xti for i ∈ [0, b].
(2)
If the index of fb satisfy b ∈ [n− 1−min(dep(m)), n− 2], then internal states at any clock
t of the two NLFSRs before and after transformation satisfy (2).
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Proof. We prove this Lemma by induction. First we suppose the internal states of the two
NLFSRs before and after transformation satisfy the relation (2) for clock t = k, then we
prove the relation holds for the next clock t = k + 1.
According to feedback functions in Definition 2, internal states of the Fibonacci NLFSR
at clock t = k + 1 are
xk+1n−1 = xk0 ⊕ gn−1(xk1 , . . . , xkn−1)
xk+1n−2 = xkn−1
. . .
xk+1b = x
k
b+1
xk+1b−1 = x
k
b
. . .
xk+10 = xk1 .
(3)
Since the compensation of the feedback functions of the transformed NLFSR is done
by following Definition 5, the feedback functions of the transformed NLFSR are
fn−1 = x0 ⊕ g′n−1(x0, . . . , xn−1)
fn−2 = xn−1
. . .
fb+1 = xb+2
fb = xb+1 ⊕m|−(n−1−b)
fb−1 = xb
. . .
f0 = x1,
where g′n−1 is the result of compensating gn−1 ⊕ m by the compensation list C =
[0, . . . , 0,m|−(n−1−b), . . . ,m|−1] iteratively. The shifted monomial m|−(n−1−b) in fb is not
compensated because max(dep(m)) ≤ n−1 is satisfied. Hence, max(dep(m|−(n−1−b))) ≤ b.
The internal states of this NLFSR at clock t = k + 1 are calculated as
xˆk+1n−1 = xˆk0 ⊕ g′n−1(xˆk0 , . . . , xˆkn−1)
xˆk+1n−2 = xˆkn−1
. . .
xˆk+1b+1 = xˆ
k
b+2
xˆk+1b = xˆ
k
b+1 ⊕ mˆ|k−(n−1−b)
xˆk+1b−1 = xˆ
k
b
. . .
xˆk+10 = xˆk1 .
(4)
Since the relation (2) holds for t = k, we have xˆki = xki for i ∈ [0, b]. Hence, xˆk+1i = xk+1i
for i ∈ [0, b − 1] is valid, which means the relation (2) holds for internal states of bits
i ∈ [0, b− 1] at clock t = k + 1.
As for bit xb, since b ∈ [n−1−min(dep(m)), n−2], we have dep(m) ⊆ [n−1−b, n−1].
Therefore, the indexes of the compensation elements satisfy
dep(m|−(n−i)) ⊆ [i− b− 1, i− 1], for i ∈ [b+ 1, n− 1]. (5)
10 iacrtrans class documentation
From (4) and xˆkb+1 = xkb+1 ⊕ m|k−(n−(b+1)), we calculate the internal state of bit xb as
xˆk+1b = xˆkb+1 ⊕ mˆ|k−(n−1−b) = xkb+1 ⊕ m|k−(n−(b+1)) ⊕ mˆ|k−(n−1−b). Then from (5), we
have dep(m|−(n−1−b)) ⊆ [0, b], hence, m|k−(n−(b+1)) = mˆ|k−(n−1−b). Therefore, we get
xˆk+1b = xkb+1 = x
k+1
b , which means the relation (2) holds for internal state of bit xb at
clock t = k + 1.
As for each bit xi, i ∈ [b + 1, n − 2], from (4) and the assumption that the relation
(2) holds for t = k, we have xˆk+1i = xˆki+1 = xki+1 ⊕ m|k−(n−(i+1)). From(4), we have
dep(m|−(n−(i+1))) ⊆ [i − b, i]. Then from (3), we get xk+1i = xki+1 and m|k−(n−(i+1)) =
m|k+1−(n−i). Therefore, we get xˆk+1i = xk+1i ⊕m|k+1−(n−i), which means the relation (2) holds
for internal states of bits i ∈ [b+ 1, n− 2] at clock t = k + 1.
As for the last bit xn−1, from (4) and (3), we calculate
xˆk+1n−1 = xˆk0 ⊕ g′n−1(xˆk0 , . . . , xˆkn−1)
= xk0 ⊕ g′n−1(xˆk0 , . . . , xˆkn−1)
= xk+1n−1 ⊕ gn−1(xk1 , . . . , xkn−1)⊕ g′n−1(xˆk0 , . . . , xˆkn−1).
(6)
Now we have to prove that gn−1(xk1 , . . . , xkn−1) ⊕ g′n−1(xˆk0 , . . . , xˆkn−1) = m|k+1−1 , we
distinguish two cases:
Case 1: max(dep(gn−1)) ≤ b. In this case, we have max(dep(gn−1 ⊕m)) ≤ b, then
no replacing of the bits in g′n−1 takes place during compensation. Hence, we have
g′n−1 = gn−1 ⊕m. then we get gn−1(xk1 , . . . , xkn−1) ⊕ g′n−1(xˆk0 , . . . , xˆkn−1) = mk = m|k+1−1 .
Therefore, we have proved that xˆk+1n−1 = xk+1n−1 ⊕m|k+1−1 , which means the relation (2) holds
for internal states of bit n− 1 at clock t = k + 1.
Case 2: max(dep(gn−1)) > b. In this case, g′n−1 is the iterative compensation result of
gn−1 ⊕m. During the compensation, the tap xi in every gj , 0 ≤ j ≤ n− 1 is replaced by
xi ⊕ C[i] iteratively from i = n − 1 to i = b+ 1, where C[i] = m|−(n−i). Each iterative
compensation step for xi makes sure that not only the taps in gn−1 ⊕ m but also the
taps in previous compensated values C[n− 1], ..., C[i+ 1] are replaced. Consequently, the
tap xb+1 appeared in g′n−1 is replaced by xb+1 ⊕m|−(n−(b+1)). The tap xb+2 appeared in
g′n−1 is replaced by xb+2 ⊕m′|−(n−(b+2)), where m′|−(n−(b+2)) is m|−(n−(b+2)) with xb+1
replaced by xb+1 ⊕m|−(n−(b+1)). The rest of taps are replaced similarly. Then from the
assumption and (5), we calculate the internal states
xˆkb+1 ⊕ mˆ|k−(n−(b+1)) = xkb+1 ⊕m|k−(n−(b+1)) ⊕m|k−(n−(b+1))
= xkb+1
xˆkb+2 ⊕ mˆ′|k−(n−(b+2)) = xˆkb+2 ⊕m|k−(n−(b+2))(xˆk1 , . . . , xˆkb+1 ⊕ mˆ|k−(n−(b+1)))
= xˆkb+2 ⊕m|k−(n−(b+2))(xk1 , . . . , xkb+1)
= xkb+2,
(7)
the internal states of rest bits xˆki ⊕ mˆ′|k−(n−i) = xki , i ∈ [b+3, n− 1] are calculated similarly.
Since the g′n−1 is the iterative compensation result of gn−1⊕m, combined with the internal
states we just calculated, we get
g′n−1(xˆk0 , . . . , xˆkn−1) = gn−1 ⊕m(xˆk0 , . . . , xˆkb , xˆkb+1 ⊕ mˆ|k−(n−(b+1)),
xˆkb+2 ⊕ mˆ′|k−(n−(b+2)) . . . , xˆkn−1 ⊕ mˆ′|k−(n−(n−1)))
= gn−1 ⊕m(xk0 , . . . , xkn−1).
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Therefore, we prove that (6) can be further calculated to
xˆk+1n−1 = xk+1n−1 ⊕ gn−1(xk1 , . . . , xkn−1)⊕ g′n−1(xˆk0 , . . . , xˆkn−1)
= xk+1n−1 ⊕m(xk0 , . . . , xkn−1)
= xk+1n−1 ⊕m|k+1−1 .
Now we have proved the relation (2) is valid for internal states at clock t = k + 1
when the internal states at clock t = k satisfy (2). Since the initial value also satisfy this
relationship, we conclude that the internal states of the two NLFSRs before and after
transformation have relationship (2) for every clock t.
3.2 Proposed Transformation Algorithms
Lemma 1 shows that the differences between internal states of the two NLFSRs are fixed
if we compensate the feedback functions after shifting a single monomial from fn−1 to fb.
The only condition is that n − 1 −min(dep(m)) ≤ b ≤ n − 2. Similarly, when we shift
multiple monomials from fn−1 to different feedback functions, a similar relationship will
hold if the condition is satisfied for each monomial. Based on this idea, we propose a new
Fibonacci-to-Galois transformation algorithm in Theorem 2. By using this algorithm, we
are able to transform a Fibonacci NLFSR into more generalized Galois NLFSRs compare
to the algorithm in [3], in which the transformed Galois NLFSR must be "uniform". By
reversing the compensation process, the Galois NLFSR can be transformed back to the
Fibonacci NLFSR. A reverse algorithm denoted as Galois-to-Fibonacci transformation
algorithm is proposed in Theorem 3. To be noted that both of the proposed algorithms
cover the "uniform" case.
Theorem 2. Given an n-bit Fibonacci NLFSR with an output function fz(x0, . . . , xn−1)
and an initial value X0 = {x00, . . . , x0n−1}, we shift r monomials m0,m1, . . . ,mr−1 from
fn−1 to feedback functions fb0 , . . . , fbr−1 , 0 ≤ b0 < b1 < . . . < br−1 ≤ n − 2 respectively.
For each monomial, we construct a compensation list by Definition 4 and xor all the
lists together as a combined compensation list C. Then we use C to compensate the
feedback functions and the output function by Definition 5, and calculate the initial value
as Xˆ0 = {xˆ0i = x0i ⊕ C[i]0, i ∈ [0, n − 1]}. If indexes of feedback functions fb0 , . . . , fbr−1
satisfy that bj ∈ [n− 1−min(dep(mj)), n− 2], j ∈ [0, r − 1], then the transformed Galois
NLFSR has feedback functions
fn−1 = x0 ⊕ g′n−1(x1, . . . , xn−1)
fi = xi+1 ⊕ g′i(x0, . . . , xi) for i ∈ [0, n− 2]
(8)
and it generates the same sequence as the Fibonacci NLFSR outputs.
Proof. According to Definition 4, the compensation list for each shifted monomial is
C0 = [0, . . . , 0,m0|−(n−1−b0), . . . ,m0|−1]
C1 = [0, . . . , 0,m1|−(n−1−b1), . . . ,m1|−1]
. . .
Cr−1 = [0, . . . , 0,mr−1|−(n−1−br−1), . . . ,mr−1|−1].
Then the combined compensation list is C = C0 ⊕ C1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ Cr−1. It is easy to get
C[bj + 1] = C[bj ]⊕m|−(n−1−bj) for j ∈ [0, r].
Since the indexes of feedback functions to which monomials shifted satisfy bj ∈
[n−1−min(dep(mj)), n−2], j ∈ [0, r−1], the indexes of the shifted monomial satisfy that
dep(mj |−(n−1−bj)) ⊆ [0, bj ]. Besides, the compensation value C[bj ] has indexes smaller
12 iacrtrans class documentation
than bj . Hence, after shifting all the monomials and compensating the feedback functions,
the indexes in gbj are in [0, bj ], resulting in feedback functions (8).
In order to prove the two NLFSRs generate same sequence, we first prove that the
differences between the internal states of the two NLFSRs are fixed as
xˆti = xti ⊕ C[i]t for i ∈ [b0 + 1, n− 1]
xˆti = xti for i ∈ [0, b0].
(9)
The proof for this relationship is simialr to the proof of Lemma 1. The only difference
is the compensation list we use is a combination of all the lists for every monomial, but
this does not affect that the resulted feedback functions (8) are the iterative compensation
result of original feedback functions with monomials shifted. Specifically, g′n−1 is gn−1 ⊕
m0⊕ . . .⊕mr−1 compensated by C iteratively. g′bj , j ∈ [0, r] is mj |−(n−1−bj) compensated
by C iteratively, and g′i = 0 if no monomial shifted to fi. Each iterative compensation step
makes sure that not only the taps in gn−1⊕m0⊕ . . .⊕mr−1,mj |−(n−1−bj) but also the taps
in previous compensated values C[n−1], ..., C[i+1] are replaced accordingly. Consequently,
the tap xb0+1 is replaced by xb0+1 ⊕ C[b0 + 1]|−(n−(b0+1)). The tap xb0+2 is replaced by
xb0+2 ⊕ C[b0 + 2]′|−(n−(b0+2)), where C[b0 + 2]′|−(n−(b0+2)) is C[b0 + 2]|−(n−(b0+2)) with
xb0+1 replaced by xb0+1 ⊕ C[b0 + 1]|−(n−(b0+1)). The rest of taps are replaced similarly.
Suppose the relationship in (9) holds for clock t = k, similar to the proof for (7), the
internal states of the transformed NLFSR at clock t = k can be calculated as
xˆkb0+1 ⊕ Cˆ[b0]|k−(n−(b0+1)) = xkb0+1 ⊕ C[b0]|k−(n−(b0+1)) ⊕ C[b0]|k−(n−(b0+1))
= xkb0+1
xˆkb0+2 ⊕ Cˆ ′[b0]|k−(n−(b0+2)) = xˆkb0+2 ⊕ C[b0]|k−(n−(b0+2))(xˆk1 , . . . , xˆkb0+1 ⊕ Cˆ[b0]|k−(n−(b0+1)))
= xˆkb0+2 ⊕ C[b0]|k−(n−(b0+2))(xk1 , . . . , xkb0+1)
= xkb0+2,
(10)
the internal states of rest bits xˆki ⊕ Cˆ[i]|k−(n−i) = xki , i ∈ [b0 + 3, n − 1] are calculated
similarly. Therefore, we get
g′n−1(xˆk0 , . . . , xˆkn−1) = gn−1 ⊕m0 ⊕ . . .⊕mr−1(xˆk0 , . . . , xˆkb0 , xˆkb0+1 ⊕ Cˆ[b0 + 1]|k−(n−(b0+1)),
xˆkb0+2 ⊕ Cˆ ′[b0 + 2]|k−(n−(b0+2)) . . . , xˆkn−1 ⊕ Cˆ ′[n− 1]|k−(n−(n−1)))
= gn−1 ⊕m0 ⊕ . . .⊕mr−1(xk0 , . . . , xkn−1)
g′bj (xˆ
k
0 , . . . , xˆ
k
bj ) = mj |−(n−1−bj)(xˆk0 , . . . , xˆkb0 , xˆkb0+1 ⊕ Cˆ[b0 + 1]|k−(n−(b0+1)),
xˆkb0+2 ⊕ Cˆ ′[b0 + 2]|k−(n−(b0+2)) . . . , xˆkbj ⊕ Cˆ ′[bj ]|k−(n−bj))
= mj |−(n−1−bj)(xk0 , . . . , xkbj ).
Therefore, we have the internal state xˆk+1n−1 of the transformed NLFSR at clock t = k + 1
calculated as
xˆk+1n−1 = xˆk0 ⊕ g′n−1(xˆk0 , . . . , xˆkn−1)
= xk+1n−1 ⊕ gn−1(xk1 , . . . , xkn−1)⊕ g′n−1(xˆk0 , . . . , xˆkn−1)
= xk+1n−1 ⊕m0 ⊕ . . .⊕mr−1(xk0 , . . . , xkn−1)
= xk+1n−1 ⊕m0|k+1−1 ⊕ . . .⊕mr−1|k+1−1
= xk+1n−1 ⊕ C[n− 1]k+1,
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the internal states xˆk+1bj , j ∈ [0, r] are
xˆk+1bj = xˆ
k
bj+1 ⊕ g′bj (xˆk0 , . . . , xˆkbj )
= xkbj+1 ⊕ C[bj + 1]k ⊕mj |−(n−1−bj)(xk0 , . . . , xkbj )
= xk+1bj ⊕ C[bj ]k+1,
the internal states xˆk+1i , i ∈ [b0 + 1, n− 2]\[b0, . . . , br] are
xˆk+1i = xˆki+1 ⊕ g′i(xˆk0 , . . . , xˆki )
= xˆki+1 ⊕ 0
= xk+1i ⊕ C[i]k+1
and the internal states xˆk+1i , i ∈ [0, b0 − 1] are
xˆk+1i = xˆki+1
= xk+1i .
Therefore, the relationship in (9) holds for internal states at clock t = k + 1. Since the
initial value X0 also satisfy this relationship, we conclude that (9) holds for every clock.
As for the output function, in the algorithm we compensate it iteratively by using C
as well. Therefore, the output function of the transformed NLFSR f ′z is the compensation
result of the original output function fz, where the tap xb0+1 is replaced by xb0+1⊕C[b0+
1]|−(n−(b0+1)). The tap xb0+2 is replaced by xb0+2 ⊕ C[b0 + 2]′|−(n−(b0+2)), where C[b0 +
2]′|−(n−(b0+2)) is C[b0+2]|−(n−(b0+2)) with xb0+1 replaced by xb0+1⊕C[b0+1]|−(n−(b0+1)).
The rest of taps are replaced similarly. According to (10), we have
f ′z(xˆt0, . . . , xˆtn−1) =fz(xˆt0, . . . , xˆtb0 , xˆ
t
b0+1 ⊕ Cˆ[b0 + 1]|t−(n−(b0+1)),
xˆtb0+2 ⊕ Cˆ ′[b0 + 2]|t−(n−(b0+2)) . . . , xˆtn−1 ⊕ Cˆ ′[n− 1]|t−(n−(n−1)))
=fz(xt0, . . . , xtn−1).
(11)
Therefore, the output sequences of the two NLFSRs before and after transformation are
the same.
Based on the result of Theorem 2, we are able to reverse the compensation process
and transform the Galois NLFSR defined in (8) back to the original Fibonacci NLFSR.
Formally, we define the feedback function as
fn−1 = x0 ⊕ gn−1(x1, . . . , xn−1)
fi = xi+1 ⊕ gi(x0, . . . , xi) for i ∈ [0, n− 2]
(12)
and propose a Galois-to-Fibonacci transformation algorithm to convert this kind of Galois
NLFSRs to Fibonacci NLFSRs in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Given an n-bit Galois NLFSR defined in (12) with an output function
fz(x0, . . . , xn−1) and an initial value X0 = {x00, . . . , x0n−1}, we shift all the monomials in
gi from fi, i ∈ [0, n− 2] to fn−1. The transformed NLFSR is obtained by following steps:
Step 1: Let the combined compensation list C = [0, . . . , 0];
Step 2: For each gi, starts from i = 0, we remove it from fi and construct a compensa-
tion list Ci = [0, . . . , 0, gi, gi|+1, . . . , gi|+(n−i)] and compute C = C ⊕ Ci;
Step 3: Compensation: we only use C[i + 1] to compensate the tap xi+1 in all the
feedback functions and the output function, which means xi+1 is replaced by xi+1⊕C[i+1];
Step 4: If i 6= n− 2, then set i = i+ 1 and go back to Step 2, otherwise, go to Step 5;
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Step 5: Now we obtain the final combined compensation list C. We xor all the shifted
monomials gi|+(n−i), i ∈ [0, n − 2] to the feedback function of bit xn−1 to get the final
feedback functions for the transformed NLFSR. The output function f ′z is constructed by
replacing xi, i ∈ [0, n − 1] in fz by xi ⊕ C[i], no iteration needed in this compensation
process;
Step 6: The initial value Xˆ0 = {xˆ00, . . . , xˆn−1} is computed by compensating X0 =
{x00, . . . , x0n−1} by C0 iteratively starting from i = 0 to i = n− 1.
The transformed NLFSR is a Fibonacci NLFSR and it generate the same sequence as
the Galois NLFSR outputs.
Proof. This theorem is completely the reverse process of the Theorem 2. The proof is
omitted.
Comparing the feedback functions of the Galois NLFSR in Theorem 2 and Theorem
3 with the "uniform" Galois NLFSR in [3], it is easy to find that the Galois NLFSR in
proposed algorithms is more generalized than the "uniform" Galois NLFSR. In fact, the
"uniform" case is included in the (12). Therefore, the two proposed algorithms both cover
the "uniform" case. In this paper, we aim to break the class of Espresso-like ciphers,
in which the Galois NLFSR is "uniform". In order to present clearly how the proposed
algorithm can cover the "uniform" case, we customize an Uniform_ Galois-to-Fibonacci
algorithm in Theorem 4.
Theorem 4. Given an n-bit uniform Galois NLFSR defined in Definition 2 with an
output function fz(x0, . . . , xn−1) and an initial value X0 = {x00, . . . , x0n−1}, we shift all the
monomials in gi from fi, i ∈ [τ, n − 2] to fn−1. The transformed NLFSR is obtained by
following steps:
Step 1: For each gi, i ∈ [τ, n− 2], we shift it to fn−1 and construct a compensation list
Ci = [0, . . . , 0, gi, gi|+1, . . . , gi|+(n−i)]. Then we xor all the Ci as a combined compensation
list C = Cτ ⊕ Cτ+1 ⊕ . . .⊕ Cn−2;
Step 2: We use the combined list C to compensate the output function by replacing xi
by xi ⊕ C[i], no iteration needed in this compensation process;
Step 3: The initial value Xˆ0 = {xˆ00, . . . , xˆn−1} is computed by compensating X0 =
{x00, . . . , xn−1} iteratively by C0 starting from i = 0 to i = n− 1.
The transformed NLFSR is a Fibonacci NLFSR and it generate the same sequence as
the Galois NLFSR outputs.
Proof. This algorithm is extracted from Theorem 3. The iterative compensation steps 2
to 4 in Theorem 3 are deleted in this algorithm. As we can see in Step 2 and Step 3 in
Theorem 3, for each gi, i ∈ [τ, n − 2] the compensation is carried out only for tap xi+1.
However, in the feedback functions of uniform Galois NLFSR, the indexes of any taps in
gi, i ∈ [τ, n− 1] are equal or smaller than τ . Hence, no compensation is executed.
4 Apply Transformation Algorithm
In this section, we apply the proposed transformation algorithm in Theorem 4 on Galois
NLFSRs constructed by Dubrova’s scalable method. The result shows that this kind of
Galois NLFSRs can always be transformed back into the original Fibonacci LFSR where
they are transformed from. For instance, we transform the Galois NLFSR in the Espresso
cipher back into a LFSR with a nonlinear output function.
4.1 Transform Galois NLFSRs with Period 2n − 1
In Section 2.2, we briefly introduced how to construct a Galois NLFSR with period 2n − 1
by using Dubrova’s scalable method. The constructed Galois NLFSR is a uniform NLFSR
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with feedback functions
fn−1 = x0 ⊕ gn−1(x1, . . . , xn−τ )
fn−2 = xn−1 ⊕ gn−2(x0, . . . , xn−τ−1)
. . .
fτ = xτ+1 ⊕ gτ (x0, x1)
fτ−1 = xτ
. . .
f0 = x1,
where n− τ ≤ τ and an output function fz.
In this subsection, we apply the Uniform_Galois-to-Fibonacci transformation algorithm
in Theorem 4 on this Galois NLFSR. The transformation process has 3 steps. We first
shift all monomials in gi, i ∈ [τ, n− 2] to fn−1. The feedback functions are transformed to
fˆn−1 = x0 ⊕ gn−1(x1, . . . , xn−τ )⊕ gτ |+n−τ−1 ⊕ . . .⊕ gn−2|+1
fˆn−2 = xn−1
. . .
fˆτ = xτ+1
. . .
fˆ0 = x1.
For each gi, we construct a compensation list Ci = [0, . . . , 0, gi, gi|+1, . . . , gi|+(n−i)]. For
example, for gτ , the compensation list is Cτ = [0, . . . , 0, gτ , gτ |+1, . . . , gτ |+(n−τ)]. Then we
get the combined compensation list as
C =Cτ ⊕ Cτ+1 ⊕ . . .⊕ Cn−2
=[0, . . . , 0, gτ , gτ |+1 ⊕ gτ+1, . . . ,
gτ |+n−τ−2 ⊕ gτ+1|+n−τ−3 ⊕ . . .⊕ gn−3|+1 ⊕ gn−2].
In Step 2, we use C to compensate the output function. The resulted output functio is
fˆz =fz(x0, . . . , xτ , xτ+1 ⊕ C[τ + 1], . . . , xn−1 ⊕ C[n− 1]
=fz(x0, . . . , xτ , xτ+1 ⊕ gτ , . . . ,
xn−1 ⊕ gτ |+n−τ−2 ⊕ gτ+1|+n−τ−3 ⊕ . . .⊕ gn−3|+1 ⊕ gn−2)
The initial value for the transformed NLFSR is calculated according to Step 3 in
Theorem 4.
As we can see, the resulted NLFSR is in Fibonacci configuration. Moreover, since the
monomials in gi, i ∈ [τ, n− 2] are all shifted from fL and two fN when the Galois NLFSR
is constructed, the feedback function fˆn−1 is actually equal to fn−1 = x0 ⊕ fL ⊕ fN ⊕ fN
which is fn−1 = x0 ⊕ fL. Therefore, the Galois NLFSR is transformed back into the
maximum-length LFSR in Fibonacci configuration with a nonlinear feedback function.
4.2 Transform Galois NLFSR in Espresso
As described in Section 2.3, the NLFSR used in Espresso cipher is a 256-bit Galois NLFSR
with a 20-variable feedback function. In this section, we apply the Uniform_Galois-to-
Fibonacci transformation algorithm to transform this Galois NLFSR. The transformation
process is similar to the application in Section 4.1. Here, we show the details of each step.
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Step 1: We shift all the monomials {x12x121, x29x52x72x99, x8x103, x5x80, x6x64, x4x45,
x3x32, x50x159⊕x189, x67x90x110x137, x46x141⊕x117, x43x118⊕x103, x44x102⊕x40, x42x83⊕
x8} from {f193, f197, f201, f205, f209, f213, f217, f231, f235, f239, f243, f247, f251} back to f255
respectively. The feedback functions are transformed to
fˆ255 = x41x70 ⊕ x74x183 ⊕ x87x110x130x157 ⊕ . . .⊕ x46x87 ⊕ x12
= x0 ⊕ x12 ⊕ x48 ⊕ x115 ⊕ x133 ⊕ x213
(13)
and fˆi = xi+1 for the rest of i ∈ [0, n− 2].
The Compensation lists for gi, i = {193, 197, 201, . . . , 251} are
C193 = [0, . . . , 0, x12x121, . . . , x73x182]
C197 = [0, . . . , 0, x29x52x72x99, . . . , x86x109x129x156]
C201 = [0, . . . , 0, x8x103, . . . , x61x156]
C205 = [0, . . . , 0, x5x80, . . . , x54x129]
C209 = [0, . . . , 0, x6x64, . . . , x51x109]
C213 = [0, . . . , 0, x4x45, . . . , x45x86]
C217 = [0, . . . , 0, x3x32, . . . , x40x69]
C231 = [0, . . . , 0, x50x159 ⊕ x189, . . . , x73x182 ⊕ x212]
C235 = [0, . . . , 0, x67x90x110x137, . . . , x86x109x129x156]
C239 = [0, . . . , 0, x46x141 ⊕ x117, . . . , x61x156 ⊕ x132]
C243 = [0, . . . , 0, x43x118 ⊕ x103, . . . , x54x129 ⊕ x114]
C247 = [0, . . . , 0, x44x102 ⊕ x40, . . . , x51x109 ⊕ x47]
C251 = [0, . . . , 0, x42x83 ⊕ x8, . . . , x45x86 ⊕ x11].
The combined compensation list is
C = [0, . . . , 0, x12x121, . . . , x16x125 ⊕ x29x52x72x99, . . . ,
x40x69 ⊕ x212 ⊕ x132 ⊕ x114 ⊕ x47 ⊕ x11].
Step 2: We use C to compensate the output function. The output function becomes
fˆz =x80 ⊕ x99 ⊕ x137 ⊕ xˆ227 ⊕ xˆ222 ⊕ x187 ⊕ xˆ243xˆ217 ⊕ xˆ247xˆ231 ⊕ xˆ213xˆ235
⊕ xˆ255xˆ251 ⊕ x181xˆ239 ⊕ x174x44 ⊕ x164x29 ⊕ xˆ255xˆ247xˆ243xˆ213x181x174,
where xˆi for i = {213, 217, 222, 227, 231, 235, 239, 243, 247, 251, 255} denotes xi replaced by
xi ⊕ C[i]. Specifically,
xˆ213 = x213 ⊕ x31x140 ⊕ x44x67x87x114 ⊕ x19x114 ⊕ x12x87 ⊕ x9x67
xˆ217 = x217 ⊕ x35x144 ⊕ x48x71x91x118 ⊕ x23x118 ⊕ x16x91 ⊕ x13x71 ⊕ x7x48
xˆ222 = x222 ⊕ x40x149 ⊕ x53x76x96x123 ⊕ x28x123 ⊕ x21x96 ⊕ x18x76 ⊕ x12x53 ⊕ x7x36
xˆ227 = x227 ⊕ x45x154 ⊕ x58x81x101x128 ⊕ x33x128 ⊕ x26x101 ⊕ x23x81 ⊕ x17x58 ⊕ x12x41
xˆ231 = x231 ⊕ x49x158 ⊕ x62x85x105x132 ⊕ x37x132 ⊕ x30x105 ⊕ x27x85 ⊕ x21x62 ⊕ x16x45
xˆ235 = x235 ⊕ x66x89x109x136 ⊕ x41x136 ⊕ x34x109 ⊕ x31x89 ⊕ x25x66 ⊕ x20x49 ⊕ x192
xˆ239 = x239 ⊕ x45x140 ⊕ x38x113 ⊕ x35x93 ⊕ x29x70 ⊕ x24x53 ⊕ x196
xˆ243 = x243 ⊕ x42x117 ⊕ x39x97 ⊕ x33x74 ⊕ x28x57 ⊕ x200 ⊕ x120
xˆ247 = x247 ⊕ x43x101 ⊕ x37x78 ⊕ x32x61 ⊕ x204 ⊕ x124 ⊕ x106
xˆ251 = x251 ⊕ x41x82 ⊕ x36x65 ⊕ x208 ⊕ x128 ⊕ x110 ⊕ x43
xˆ255 = x255 ⊕ x40x69 ⊕ x212 ⊕ x132 ⊕ x114 ⊕ x47 ⊕ x11.
Ge Yao and Udaya Parampalli 17
Step 3: The initial value Xˆ0 for the transformed NLFSR is calculated by compensating
X0 = {x00, . . . , x0255} by C0 iteratively starting from i = 0 to i = 255.
As we can see in the final feedback functions (13), the feedback only fed to the last
stage x255 and the feedback function f255 only contains linear terms. Therefore, the
transformed NLFSR is a Fibonacci LFSR. The Espresso cipher is actually equivalent
to a LFSR filter generator. Specifically, the nonlinear output function consists of 2289
monomials. There are 104 variables in the function and the algebraic degree is 12. With
the corresponding initial value, transformed feedback functions and transformed output
function, the transformed LFSR generates the same output sequence as the Galois NLFSR
G in Espresso cipher does.
5 Cryptanalysis
In this section, we conduct cryptabalysis on transformed version of the Espresso stream
cipher, which is a LFSR filter generator according to the result in last section. The security
analysis of LFSR filter generators has been thoroughly studied in literature. Several
powerful cryptanalytic attacks such as algebraic attacks and correlation attacks have been
proposed to break LFSR filter generators.
5.1 Algebraic Attack
Algebraic attack is a very powerful cryptanalysis technique to break LFSR filter generators.
The basic idea is to build a system of equations connecting the keystream bits and the
initial state of the LFSR, and then solve these equations to recover the secret key in
the initial state. The equations are obtained either directly using the output function or
multiplying it with a well chosen multivariate equation to lower the degree of the output
function.
5.1.1 Standard Algebraic Attack.
The most representative algebraic attack is proposed by Courtois [11, 12]. A detailed
analysis of complexity of this standard algebraic attack is re-estimated by Hawkes and
Rose [13]. We apply this attack on the transformed LFSR in Section 4. The attack process
and the complexity of each step are presented below.
Step 1: Form a system of equations. As presented in Section 4, the output function
of the transformed LFSR is a 12 degree Boolean function with 104 variables. First, we
consider reducing the algebraic degree of the equations which we get from the output
function to relate the output keystream bits to the initial state of the LFSR. From the
function fˆz, we observe that monomials with highest degree are included in the term
xˆ255xˆ247xˆ243xˆ213x181x174 where xˆ255, xˆ247, xˆ243 and xˆ213 are represented in previous
section. This term can be expended into 2058 monomials. It is noteworthy that the
bit x181 and x174 appear in all these monomials. Therefore, we can multiply the output
function with (x181 + 1) or (x174 + 1) and obtain a Boolean function with lower degree.
Moreover, we can further reduce the degree by multiplying it with (x44 + 1) or (x67 + 1)
or x87 + 1) or (x114 + 1) or (x66 + 1) or (x89 + 1) or (x109 + 1) or x136 + 1). In total we
obtain 16 functions with degree 8. One of such function is sufficient to form a system
of multivariate equations we need for the attack. For instance, we multiply the output
function fz with g = (x181 + 1)(x44 + 1) to get function h
h = fzg = fz(x181 + 1)(x44 + 1).
The degree of the output function fz is denoted as df = 12, the degree of g is e = 2 and
the degree of h is d = 8. For each known keystream bit zt at clock t, we derive equation
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h( ~Xt) = ztg( ~Xt).
Since the keystream zt is a binary bit and only affect g(Xt), we rewrite the equation as
h( ~Xt) + g( ~Xt, zt) = 0. (14)
The complexity for this step can be ignored.
Step 2: Pre-computation. As described in [13], any Boolean function of the LFSR
state can be expressed as a product of the monomial state matrix ~Md with a row vector of
that Boolean function such as ~h and ~g. Mapping from one monomial state to the next
monomial state can be expressed as a matrix product ~M t+1d = ~Rd ~M td. Moreover, for every
clock t, the monomial state of the LFSR can be expressed as ~M td = ~Rtd · ~M0d . We consider
the Boolean functions h and g as depending on distinct monomial states ~Md and ~Me,
with corresponding monomial state rewriting matrices ~Rd and ~Re [13]. ~Md represents
all D =
∑d
i=0
(
n
i
)
monomials of degree d or less and Me represents all E =
∑e
i=0
(
n
i
)
monomials of degree e or less. Equation (14) is then rewritten as
h(~Rtd · ~M0d ) + g(~Rte · ~M0e ) = 0~h · ~Rtd · ~M0d + ~g(~zt) · ~Rte · ~M0e = 0. (15)
For the monomial state rewriting matrix ~Rd, there exists a characteristic polynomial
p(x) =
∑D
i=0 pixi so that ∑D
i=0 pi · ~Rid = ~0,
where ~0 represents the all-zero matrix. The characteristic polynomial can be computed by
the Theorem 1 and the steps presented in [13] inspired by [20].
We find the linear combination such that∑D
i=0 pi · (~h · ~Rt+id · ~M0d + ~g(~zt+i) · ~Rt+ie · ~M0e ) = 0.
The equation can be further expanded as
~h · ~Rtd · ~M0d ·
∑D
i=0 pi · ~Rid + ~M0e ·
∑D
i=0 pi · ~g(~zt+i) · ~Rt+ie = 0.
From (15), we have
~M0e ·
∑D
i=0 pi · ~g(~zt+i) · ~Rt+ie = 0.
The complexity of this step depends on the computation of the characteristic polynomial,
which requires c ·D(n(logn)2 + (log2D)3) operations for small constant c.
Step 3: Substitution. The equation in step 2 is performed component-wise, so we
write the equation for t = 1, . . . , E. Then the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) is applied to
substitute the obtained keystream bits into the equations. The complexity of this step is
2DE(log2E).
Step 4: Solving the equations. The last step is to solve the equations by linearization.
The complexity of this step is Eω, where ω = 2.807 is the exponent of the Gaussian
reduction [14].
Among all the 4 steps, the dominant complexity is in the Step 3. The complexity of
this attack is 2ED(log2E). The number of required keystream bits is D+E−1. Therefore,
we can break Espresso cipher by using the standard algebraic attack with 248.58 keystream
bits and the computation complexity is O(268.44).
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5.1.2 Rønjom-Helleseth Attack.
We also consider the attack proposed by Rønjom-Helleseth [14]. In this attack, the idea
of expressing the output function in terms of monomials of initial state and finding the
characteristic polynomial of the coefficient sequences of all monomials is also adapted. The
main difference from the standard algebraic attack described in Section 5.1 is in the step
of solving the equations. This attack only needs to solve the linear part of the formed
system of equations. The process of this attack includes:
Step 1: Pre-computation. From the output function, compute the characteristic
polynomial p(x) =
∑D−n
j=0 pjx
j of the coefficient sequences of all monomial of degree ≥ 2.
The complexity of this step is O(D(log2D)3).
Step 2: Form a linear equation system. For each output keystream bit, we represent it
as zt = ft(x00, . . . , x0n−1). From the characteristic polynomial p(x), we form a system of
equations
z∗t = f∗t (x00, . . . , x0n−1) for t = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1,
where
z∗t =
∑D−n
j=0 pjzt+j
and
f∗t =
∑D−n
j=0 pjft+j(x00, . . . , x0n−1).
The complexity of this step is determined by the calculation of z∗t and f∗t , which is
O(D).
Step 3: Solving the system of linear equations. The complexity of this step is O(nω).
In conclusion, by using this attack, we break the Espresso cipher with computation
complexity of O(266.86), pre-computation complexity O(284.97) and 266.86 keystream bits.
In order to resist the algebraic attack, the degree of the output function in the transformed
version of the cipher should be at least 30 and the output function should have large
algebraic immunity.
5.2 Overall Security Analysis
Another powerful attack against LFSR filter generators is correlation attack. The basic idea
is to derive linear approximation equations of the nonlinear output function to recover the
initial state [21, 22]. In 2010, Rønjom and Cid [23] investigated the nonlinear equivalence
of LFSR-based stream ciphers. In the paper, they showed how to change the primitive
root of the underlying finite field to obtain an equivalent filter generators. They also
pointed out that current analysis of distance from a nonlinear function to the space of
affine functions is incomplete with respect to LFSR-based stream ciphers. They redefine
the nonlinearity of the LFSR filter function as the minimal distance between equivalent
filter functions and affine functions, which implies that a correlation attack may be more
successful on a weak equivalent generator. This observation has been proved by Canteaut
and Rotella at FSE 2016 [24]. In their paper, they describe how to mount a fast correlation
attack on equivalent LFSR filters. By following their result and Ronjom and Cid’s idea
of changing the primitive root of the underlying finite field to obtain an equivalent filter
generator, a fast correlation attack is a potential threat to the Espresso cipher.
In the design of Espresso cipher, the security analysis is conducted on a NLFSR F
instead of the original Galois NLFSR G. As the author claimed [2], F is equivalent to the
original Galois NLFSR G. However, according to our proposed transformation algorithm,
the two NLFSRs F and G are equivalent only if the output function of F is changed
accordingly. Therefore, the security analysis of the cipher is not conducted on the actual
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cipher. Whether it is resistant to chosen IV attacks, differential attacks and weak key
attacks needs to be reassessed. Moreover, a known attack against Espresso cipher proposed
in [9] is a related key chosen IV attack. This attack is also not mounted on the original
Galois NLFSR G but on another NLFSR based cipher denoted as Espresso-a. Nevertheless,
the two ciphers would not generate same sequence when the output functions are the same.
The output function of Espresso-a should be transformed by the proposed algorithm in
Theorem 4. Whether the Espresso cipher is weak against this attack or not should be
reevaluated.
The idea of using Galois NLFSRs constructed from maximum length LFSR to build
stream ciphers can certainly optimise the hardware size and the throughput of the cipher.
However, this innovative design methodology exposes weaknesses to existing cryptanalytic
attacks. Therefore, this kind of design method should be avoided in the future.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyse the security of Espresso-like stream ciphers based on Galois
NLFSRs constructed from maximum length LFSRs. Considering the problem in existing
transformation algorithms, we develop the idea of compensating the output function
and feedback functions in the cipher and propose a Fibonacci-to-Galois and a Galois-to-
Fibonacci transformation algorithm. Then we customize an Uniform_Galois-to-Fibonacci
algorithm to transform the Galois NLFSR in Espresso-like cipher. The result shows that
the transformed cipher is actually a linear filter generator based stream cipher. As an
example, the Espresso cipher is transformed into a LFSR filter generator with a nonlinear
output function. The transformed cipher is broken by the standard algebraic attack and
the Rønjom-Helleseth attack. At last, we analyse the security of this kind stream cipher
from the overall perspective and point out that this kind of design method should be
avoided in the future.
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